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A. Historical Background Of The Bill Of Lading
While it is not absolutely necessary in an Article of this nature
to probe deeply into history, some insight into the origin of today's
bill of lading is necessary in order to understand fully not only in
what manner the instrument performs its functions but, of even
more importance, the place of past events in the development of the
particular topic under discussion: the effect of certain conflict of law
rules on the bill of lading.
It is somewhat surprising to find that the early history of the bill
of lading is a subject which has received little attention.1 There is,
however, not much doubt that the instrument is one that has seen
a great deal of service for at least four centuries,' and there is at
least fragmentary evidence that it was a necessary step in the carriage
of goods by water many years prior to this. Certainly there is no
dearth of written material on the more recent advances made in the
law of ocean bills and, of course, this is due in large measure to the
somewhat frantic steps taken by various maritime powers subsequent
to the latter half of the nineteenth century." This wide development
* LL.B., Dalhousie University; LL.M., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., Univer-
sity of Michigan; Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
This Article is part of the thesis written by Professor Sinclair in pursuance of a S. J. D.
degree at the University of Michigan. The next issue of the Journal will present a sub-
sequent part of the thesis.
' Bennett's somewhat novel thesis that the bill of lading grew from the ship's register
is interesting. Bennett, The Bill of Lading (1914). This view is evidently shared by
Holdsworth. See 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 255 (1926). Many people believe
however that out of the ship's register grew the ship's log as it is known today. See, e.g.,
Purchase, The Law Relating to Documents of Title to Goods 23 (1931).
aSee, e.g., Hurste v. Barnyes, (1538) 1 Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty, The
Selden Society 72 (1892).
a Thomas, Early Mayor's Court Rolls 243 (1924), gives a case involving the origin of
a bill of lading in 1305. A quotation from an early English case is given by Britton,
Negotiable Documents of Title, 5 Hastings L.J. 103, 104 (1953), referring to a bill of
lading dated June 25, 1390.
4 Many of these writings have been drawn on for this work; others have been con-
sulted. Some of these are cited on the following pages; a partial list of those not cited
is as follows: Cole, Charters and Bills of Lading (1925); Deutsch, Model Ocean Bill of
Lading (1940); Williamson and Payne, The Carriage of Goods by Sea (1934). The list
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of comparatively recent years will occupy a major portion of this
introductory section, but it is perhaps best to begin somewhat earlier
to gain the full view of the development of this document which is
of so much importance today.
It will eventually be seen that the branch of maritime law dealing
with bills of lading is in a state today which at least may be said to
approach uniformity, due almost entirely to international conven-
tions and that branch of the law which is so vaguely described as the
"general maritime law." How odd it is then to find that this uni-
formity was, in all probability, the essence of the picture in the
beginnings of maritime commerce. One does not have to delve too
deeply into historical texts to ascertain that it was the merchant who
was all-powerful in matters commercial in the Middle Ages. All over
Europe, the merchant was the one who in reality formulated what
laws there were regarding commerce. It was through the customs and
practices of the local merchants acting within their local tribunals
that the famous body of law known as the Law Merchant sprang
into being. And, when states began to be formed and power cen-
tralized, it was only natural for such central authorities as there
were to adopt the Law Merchant as the body of rules to govern
mercantile affairs. Similarly, because of the shipment of goods from
one area to another, the Law Merchant was, when taken in its entirety,
not too dissimilar from state to state. It is no doubt beyond question
that there were differing local customs and practices on minor points,
but the over-all picture was one of uniformity.'
What effect then did the Law Merchant have on bills of lading?
In the earliest days of shipping there was no need of any such instru-
ment. The merchant travelled along with his goods not only to
assure their safe arrival, but personally to bargain with and deliver
them to the consignee.! This being the case, the more or less uniform
customs were aids to the merchants directly; that is, in their active
dealings with others of their own type and not, as it later came to
be, in the interpretation of any documents." So, through the years,
custom flourished and became a more or less central core upon which
these men relied and presumed.
of law review articles is somewhat lengthy but one may refer to: McLauglin, The Evo-
lution of the Ocean Bill of Lading, 35 Yale L.J. 548 (1926); Case and Comment, 34
Can. B. Rev. 1196 (1956); Recent Case Note, 7 Camb. L.J. 265 (1939-41).
a Bennett, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2, quotes from Blackburn, Contract of Sale, as
follows: "[T]here are in some cases, differences and peculiarities which by the municipal
law of each country are grafted on it, but the general rules of the Law Merchant are
the same in all countries."
o Purchase, op. cit. supra note 1, at 23.
'A very interesting article on this subject by Sir Patrick Devlin, Judge of the High
Court, Queen's Bench Division, appears in Arkiv for Sjrett, Oslo, (1952) at 281.
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With the rise of states and the resulting centralization of authority,
the procedures of the Law Merchant began to emerge in the written
form of codes. Reference to the Black Book of the Admiralty will
show many such codes collected therein. Anyone who has studied,
even cursorily, the maritime law will recall being referred to the
Codes of Oleron and Wisby, among others.! These collections of laws
relating to maritime mercantile practice became of increasing impor-
tance in the next step of the development of modern water carriage.
As merchants began to send out more and more shipments to even
greater distant ports, it became physically impossible for them to
travel with the goods. Hence, it became the practice of merchants to
give oral instructions to the master of the vessel regarding care and
disposition of the cargo. It is an easy step from oral instructions to
written ones, and it is quite probable that it is at this juncture that
the bill of lading was born.
To hasten the story, it need only be said that by the sixteenth
century the bill of lading had reached some degree of popularity.!
It will be noticed that the first step in the shipment of goods, as
between the master of the vessel and the consignor (the carrier and
the shipper), was an oral agreement. As time progressed the oral
contract was reduced to writing. That is, it became a written agree-
ment setting forth in express fashion the contract between the parties.
It will be seen that this is one of the three major functions of the
bill of lading."0 Occasionally, problems had arisen regarding receipt
of the goods by the vessel, such as the condition of the shipment,
number of pieces, and so on. It was then only natural to turn to the
bill of lading as a solving tool and the bill soon was thought of as
a receipt for the goods.
It is in connection with a further use of the bill that history again
steps into the picture. While it is quite possible that prior to 1793,
passage of title to goods could be had by transfer of the document
of title to those goods, in a House of Lords decision of that year, it
was held that
by the custom of merchants, bills of lading, expressing goods or mer-
chandizes to have been shipped by any person or persons to be delivered
to order or assigns, have been, and are, at any time after such goods
have been shipped, and before the voyage performed, for which they
8 Historical references to these ancient codes are contained in most texts on admiralty;
for a recent example, see Gilmore and Black, Admiralty 2-11 (1957).
'"[W]hen the records of the Court of the English Lord High Admiral begin we find
it in existence as a document well known to the commercial world, everywhere reduced
to a more or less stereotyped form and which had evidently been in use for a long period
prior to 1530." Bennett, op. cit. supra note 1, at 8.10 See p. 10 infra.
1961]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
have been or are shipped, negotiable and transferable by the shipper or
shippers of such goods to any other person or persons, by such shipper
or shippers indorsing such bills with his, her or their name or names,
and delivering or transmitting the same so indorsed, or causing the
same to be so delivered or transmitted to such other person or persons;
and that by such indorsement and delivery, or transmission, the property
in such goods hath been, and is transferred and passed to such other
person or persons."
It is quite understandable, as speeds increased and it became possible
for fast ships to take a bill of lading and put it down sometimes
weeks in advance of the arrival of the cargo it represented, that this
aspect of the bill became of great, if not the greatest, importance.
And so commerce ran for a good many years, without much
change or regulation. The situation in England and the United
States was about the same in respect to the relationship of the shipper
and the carrier. To describe this briefly, it can be said that the carrier
was considered as a bailee of the goods and as such had imposed upon
him various stringent responsibilities. It was thought that it was,
as Robinson puts it," "social utility" to fasten onto the carrier an
"insurer's"" liability. Of course, it did not take the latter long to
realize that he was, without more, in a very precarious position
indeed, and he soon changed the shoe to the other foot. In England
and Continental Europe, freedom of contracting has always been a
rigidly adhered to principle," and it was not difficult for a carrier
in such an atmosphere to quickly take advantage of this policy. The
result was that the carriers assumed the position that they had almost
no liability for the carriage of goods, not even for damage re-
sulting from their own negligence, and these assumptions they
incorporated as terms of their contracts of carriage in the bills of
lading.15 In the United States the picture was not nearly as clear,
due in main to the federal system and the conflicting rules of state
and federal courts. To state it as shortly as possible, the federal courts
went almost as far as the English courts had in allowing stipulations
" Lickbarrow v. Mason, 5 T.R. 685, 686, 101 Eng. Rep. 380, 382 (K.B. 1794).
" Robinson, Admiralty 494 (1939).
" Knauth, Ocean Bills of Lading 116 (1953), criticizes this stand of insurer's liability,
holding that such cannot be the case where damage resulting from an Act of God or the
King's enemies is omitted from the list of liabilities of a carrier, but is within the similar
list of an insurer.14 See Boissevain v. Weil, (1949) 1 K.B. 482; 7 Halsbury's Laws of England 72-73
(1954); Scrutton, Charterparties 20 (1955); Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law,
I Am. J. Comp. L. 341 (1952); Comment, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy" in
Contracts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 553 (1957).
" "With the advent of steam and the tremendous growth of safe and rapid transport
by sea in the 19th century, the carriers developed the 'Free' contract to such a point
where it could be said that the carrier accepted the goods to be carried when he liked,
as he liked, and wherever he liked." Knauth, op. cit. supra note 13, at 116.
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by carriers that there would be no liability for damage to goods.
There was, however, one major exception, based on public policy,
in the form of a rule which forbade any stipulation exonerating a
vessel from liability arising from negligence of the owners, or their
agents, officers, or crew.16 The real problem arose, however, when
some of the state courts refused to find any such public policy, and
chose to follow the English view, which allowed all exemptions
including that of negligence by the carrier."
With the exertion of a great deal of pressure on various interna-
tional law bodies and domestic legislative assemblies by both carriers
and shippers, plans gradually began to evolve and came to first
fruition in the United States in 1893, with the passage by Congress
of the Harter Act."6 While it is one of the most important pieces of
legislation dealing with maritime law, the act is very simple in
its provisions and attempts a conciliation between the conflicting
interests of carriers and shippers. The first three sections of the act
contain substantial innovations prohibiting the carrier from stipulat-
ing in the bill that he will not be liable for failure to use due diligence
in making the vessel seaworthy and for failure to fulfill the obligation
properly to load, stow, carry, and deliver the cargo;" the carrier is
protected by allowing exoneration from liability for damage caused
by negligent navigation or management of the vessel, provided due
diligence was used to provide a vessel which is seaworthy. ° There is
no doubt that the concession to the United States carrier was added
simply to console him and to encourage his activities."
This statute received world-wide recognition as a basic prerequisite
to a solution of the bill of lading problem. The international associa-
tions once again pressed forward and their efforts were rewarded in
1921 with the adoption of the Hague Rules. The events which led
up to their adoption were precipitated no doubt by the catalytic
effect on shipping of World War I, and the activity by British
16Cuzco v. The Sucaresco, 294 U.S. 394 (1935).
7See, e.g., Rubens v. Ludgate Hill S.S. Co., 65 Hun. 625, 20 N.Y. Supp. 481
(1892).
127 Stat. 445-46 (1893), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 190-95 (1958). The throes of adopting
such legislation and the events leading up to it are well summarized in Knauth, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 118-22.
'p27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C.A. § 190 (1958).
2027 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C.A. § 192 (1958).
1 Mr. Harter himself put it this way on the floor of the House: "[Tihe bill would
not influence or affect one one-hundredth of one percent of American ships." Quoted
in Knauth, op. cit. supra note 13, at 120. It is perhaps significant that by the middle
of the twentieth century a radical change had been effected. In 1951, the Maritime Ad-
ministration, Department of Commerce, reported that there were 3,464 vessels in the
United States merchant fleet which represented about one-third of the world's tonnage.
See Britton, supra note 3, at 103.
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interests in the immediate post-war years. Cargo owners were clamor-
ing for protection and pointed to the Harter Act principles as the
only just solution." The real problem with the Hague Rules soon be-
came apparent. It had nothing to do with their content, but rather
with their applicability. When adopted, it had been provided that the
rules would be incorporated by the carriers in the various adopting
countries, voluntarily, in bills of lading. This idea of voluntariness,
even though such a scheme had been successful with the York-
Antwerp Rules, 3 combined with violent assertions of unfairness by
the shipping industry, compelled the powers to change their approach.
This was done at Brussels in 1924, when fourteen nations subscribed
to the Convention bearing the name of that city. Their agreements,
however, were subject to ratification in their own countries and here
the spark died down. England and most of the members of the
British Commonwealth passed enacting legislation within two years.
In the following ten years, England and her shipping interests be-
came increasingly concerned at the apathetic attitude of other sea-
faring countries and there was talk of revoking the legislation. In
1936, however, the necessary legislation finally won its way through
the Congress of the United States and the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (hereinafter referred to as Cogsa)24 became law. Patterned on
the Harter Act, Cogsa embodied some major differences, however.
Under the provisions of the Harter Act there is no exemption for a
carrier for liability arising out of damage caused by an unseaworthy
vessel. There are exemptions from liability where the damage was
caused by some other forces, but these immunities depend upon the
exercise of due diligence by the carrier to provide a seaworthy vessel.
Under Cogsa, on the other hand, the carrier is not bound to provide
a seaworthy vessel, but only to exercise due diligence to do so. The
193 6 Act does not condition the exemptions allowed the carrier on due
diligence as does the Harter Act, but does so only for loss due directly
to unseaworthiness. The acts likewise differ in their application, the
Harter Act governing shipments "from or between ports of the
United States and foreign ports,"" while Cogsa applies only to
shipments to and from United States ports in foreign trade." Like-
wise, Cogsa only applies to such shipments from the time they are
22 Cargo owners were spurred on, no doubt, by the fact that legislation embodying
Harter Act principles was already in effect in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
" These rules, first adopted in 1890, have been amended a number of times, lately in
1950. The rules deal with general average and have become of major importance in this
area.
2449 Stat. 1207-13 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1300-15 (1958).
2527 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C.A. § 190 (1958).
2649 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1300 (1958).
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loaded on the vessel to the time they are off-loaded." In such cases,
the provisions of the Harter Act are superseded by Cogsa." Harter
does apply, however, to the two periods of time at either end of the
voyage, i.e., from the time the carrier receives the goods until they
are loaded and similarly, during the period of time between unload-
ing and delivery. The Harter Act also applies to the coasting trade-
between ports in the United States-unless the bill in such a voyage
expressly stipulates for the application of Cogsa."
Space prohibits any further examination of the situation as it
exists today; suffice it to say, that it appears that the circle has come
fully around. It was seen how, in the very early days of shipping,
there was a large measure of uniformity arising from the Law
Merchant. Then, it developed that there were many conflicting
rules, almost as many as there were jurisdictions; and, finally, the
struggle for uniformity again has apparently succeeded. However,
it is only at first blush that there appears to be a semblance of
uniformity. Upon further investigation of the various rules extant
in the maritime nations, even in those that have enacted laws stem-
ming from the Brussels Convention,"0 there are differences." When
differences appear, the conflict of law problems are not far behind,
and it is now in order to investigate these two areas, viz, the differ-
ences in the laws and the resulting conflict of law problems.
B. Why A Conflict Of Law Problem?
The movements toward uniformity have reduced the conflicts
between laws in some areas of maritime practice. It is, however,
equally true that many problems still remain from the era prior to
attempted uniformity, and some new ones have crept in hard on the
heels of uniformity and because of it."
Where are the conflict problems and how do they arise? This is
the area to which attention must now be directed. Once the problems
2749 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1301(e) (1958).
249 Stat. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (1958).
2949 Stat. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. S 1312 (1958).
30Viz., Belgium, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France (and Algeria),
Germany, Great Britain (and Northern Ireland), Hungary, India, Italy, Monaco, Nor-
way, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. (Austra-
lia, Canada, New Zealand, and many other former and present British colonies have en-
acted the legislation but have never ratified the Convention. For a complete list see Knauth,
op. cit. supra note 13, at Part LV.)
asSee Memorandum, 51 Stat. 269 (1937).
"s To mention only one of many such "new" conflict possibilities, the provision in the
United States Cogsa applies to inbound as well as outbound shipments [49 Stat. 1212
(1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1312 (1958)]; the English Cogsa applies, however, only to those
shipments originating in Great Britain and Northern Ireland; the Australian, Canadian,
and New Zealand statutes being, in this respect, the same as the English.
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are found, it will be in order to investigate possible solutions. To
begin, it is of course clear that in maritime commerce the bulk of
shipments is trans-oceanic; that is, there will be involved in the
transaction two nations. Many shipments as well will be interstate
as far as the United States is concerned. It can be concluded then
that the great majority of shipments on bills of lading will be inter-
state or foreign in nature. There is no more natural place for con-
flict of law questions to arise. The possibilities are as numerous as
the combinations permit. There are shipments originating in the
United States and travelling to another nation and the converse of
this situation; shipments made from one state in the Union to
another; and from foreign port to foreign port. When there is added
to this the almost limitless number of fora that are possible, the
permutations become almost infinite.
While the conflict problems inherent in the negotiation and transfer
of bills of lading as documents of title will be studied at a later time
in some detail,3 in this introductory part it will perhaps best serve
if closer investigation is made of the validity of the bill of lading
provisions as they raise conflict of law problems. It should be kept
in mind that this section is not meant to be exhaustive but, rather,
merely illustrative of the types of situations which will later be found
and studied.
When a case comes before a court in the United States on the
validity of a clause in a bill of lading, e.g., on a stipulation limiting
liability of a carrier for his own negligence, the conflict question be-
comes one of great moment. The court of the forum must immedi-
ately ask itself this question: What is the proper law to govern the
validity of this exemption? Two basic choices-although there are
possibly some others-are immediately presented: the lex loci con-
tractus and the lex loci solutionis. Suppose that the bill of lading was
issued in England and it covers a shipment from Liverpool to New
York. The forum can follow the view adopted by the Restatement
and say that the "law of the place of contracting determines the
validity of a contract limiting the carrier's liability."3 English law
thus becomes the proper law to govern the validity of this clause.
Presumably, however, the United States forum could adopt the place
of performance rule and hold that American law should govern."
33 See parts II and III infra, pp. 17, 32.
34Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 338 (1934).
"5 "It is a general rule that every contract as to its validity, nature, interpretation and
effect, or, as they may be called, the right, in contradistinction to the remedy, is gov-
erned by the law of the place where it is made, unless it is to be performed in another
place; and then it is governed by the law of the place where it is to be performed. Story's
Confl. of Laws, §§ 242, 260, 263 & 280." Muncure, J. in Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman,
[Vol. 1 $
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Even if the lex loci contractus is selected, it is very possible that in
cases where that law is different from the law of the forum, public
policy will rear its head and defeat application of that law. " Of
course, in the example given, as Cogsa terms are legislative mandates
in both countries, it may be said that which law is selected is
immaterial. To this it is possible to reply that on some points the
adoption of Cogsa in these countries is not truly uniform in all
respects,"' and when a country which has not enacted Cogsa is
substituted for, e.g., England, the possibilities of conflict are in-
creased many times. It may safely be said that, while many more
problems will arise in shipments covered by bills of lading where
the two countries involved have not adopted Cogsa provisions or
where only one of them has, there is still the possibility that such
questions will arise in those cases where Cogsa is a part of the law
of both the countries involved.
In a situation where the laws are different, in that Cogsa has not
been adopted by either state or by only one, the second aspect of
the conflict problem arises. Here, choice of law rules as to the proper
law will perhaps, and frequently do, vary greatly. Some bodies of
law favor freedom of contracting and while jealously guarding it
allow the contracting parties great liberty in selection of the govern-
ing law.8 Some others follow a somewhat narrower approach and
frown upon the idea of the parties making a legislature of them-
selves, " so that there will be the law intended by the parties on the
one hand aligned against a lex loci contractus, law of the flag, ' or
place of performance rule on the other.
Finally, suppose a situation where an action is brought in a court
in the United States to ascertain the validity of a stipulation in a bill
of lading covering a shipment between two foreign ports. In this
situation what law should the United States forum decide upon?
Can it apply its own law, or can it choose arbitrarily between the
57 Va. 126, 127 (1860). See also Andrews v. Pond, 15 U.S. (13 Pet.) 42 (1839); Story,
Conflict of Laws § 280 (2d ed. 1880).
"SSee Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925).
37 See note 32 supra. It is interesting to note here one more possible source of conflict.
Denmark, France, Norway, and Sweden have ratified the Brussels Convention for all ship-
ments leaving their countries but provide that for any entering shipments the rules will
apply only if the shipments originate in a country which has ratified tle Convention.
Shipments from other nations are not so subject. See also Singer, Liner Bills of Lading
and the International Bill of Lading Convention 8 (1923).
" England and the Continental European countries are somewhat firm in this respect.
"In regard to charterparties and bills of lading the general rule as to contracts applies;
they will be governed by the law by which the parties intend to be bound .... " Scrut-
ton, op. cit. supra note 14, at 21. See 1 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws; A Comparative
Study 90-94 (rev. ed. 1958); Yntema, supra note 14, at 345.
"9See E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
4"Lloyd v. Guibert, (1865) 1 Q.B. 115; see Scrutton, op. cit. supra note 14, at 24-25.
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law of the other two states? Suppose, for sake of illustration, a ship-
ment from Hong Kong to Antwerp; a stipulation in the bill exempt-
ing the carrier from liability for his own negligence; destruction of
the goods due to such cause; and finally, a suit on the matter in the
United States. What is the court here to do? Conceivably, it could
choose the lex loci contractus, the law of the place of performance,
the lex fori, the law intended by the parties, or some other law. After
doing so, it could then reverse its field and refuse to enforce such law
as contrary to the public policy of the United States. These are
merely possibilities and what is the correct approach and the approach
most used will require considerable analysis when a later section is
reached. It is enough now to point out the conflict problems which
can and do arise.
To summarize briefly: Although it is possible to make a vague
comparison of shipping laws in relation to bills of lading in the
direction of uniformity, there are a number of areas in which the
conflict problems are still with us. The first is in that somewhat rare
instance where the Cogsa provisions differ in those states adopting
them. Secondly, where there is at least one state that has not adopted
the legislation, choice of law problems become acute and profuse-
particularly when topped with the many situations possible depend-
ing upon choice of forum. And, finally, problems arise where the
forum is in the United States and the shipment is between two
foreign ports or ports in two foreign countries. Certainly in the first
two categories, if the forum is in the United States, Cogsa is going
to play the predominant role as expressing in itself the proper law
or as an expression of public policy. In the third situation, public
policy may (and has) come in, but it is perhaps best to restrict that
policy to cases to which the statute expressly applies, that is, to
"shipments by vessels between ports of this country and the ports
of foreign countries."41 There should be no question then that the
conflict of laws is and will continue to be a most important facet
of maritime commercial law.
C. The Nature Of The Bill Of Lading-Its Three-Fold Function
1. As Containing the Terms of the Contract
It is best to begin here by distinguishing between a bill of lading
and a charterparty, for the two forms occasionally become inter-
twined.42 Both have the same beginnings but subsequently there is
4
1 F. A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 417, 173 N.E. 564, 568
(1930).
42 E.g., in that instance where bills of lading are issued by a charterer.
[Vol. 15
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a rapid and wide divergence. The usual practice is that preliminary
negotiations will be oral or written, but nearly always in a somewhat
informal fashion. Upon a satisfactory meeting of the minds, the
written work enters the scene. This may be referred to as a contract
of affreightment, but the much more usual terms are bills of lading
and charterparties, which, as will be seen later, are radically differ-
ent documents. Briefly, the bill of lading is a document which
represents the contractual terms agreed upon between the carrier or
his agent and the shipper regarding the carriage of goods by the
former in his ship. The charterparty is somewhat different in that by
it the shipper will hire the ship for his or another's cargo.4
Restricting the scope of this section to the bill of lading, it should
be pointed out that two different varieties of bills predominate. The
straight bill of lading is that type "in which it is stated that the
goods are consigned or destined to a specific person. . . ."" Under
such a bill, the named consignee is treated as the owner of the goods
once they are delivered to the carrier and, perhaps more important,
the negotiation of the bill is impossible." The order bill differs greatly
from the straight bill because it is "a bill in which it is stated that
the goods are consigned or destined to the order of any person named
in such bill . ,"6 While the order bill had not at common law
enjoyed the same status as a bill of exchange or promissory note, 7
many statutes have elevated it practically to the rank of these latter
instruments in the area of negotiability." More on this aspect will be
considered later.4 '
When entering the field of consideration of the bill of lading as a
contract, it is best to start by saying that the bill of lading is not
a contract. 50 It is at best mere evidence of a contract between the
carrier and the shipper. The bill of lading in its contractual aspect
is at most a document which contains some of the terms of agreement,
but certainly not all. The contract itself was made between the
parties before the bill of lading was signed. These terms are evidenced
by the bill in part; many of the contractual rights and obligations
" Bills of lading may, and frequently are, issued by the charterer under a charter-
party. Such a bill is no different than one issued by a common carrier but different re-
sults may follow on questions of liability in respect to the ship owner and the charterer.
4439 Stat. 539 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. § 82 (1958).
4 Swift v. Davis, 118 Misc. 205, 193 N.Y. Supp. 848 (1922).
4'39 Stat. 539 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. § 83 (1958).
" "A bill of lading is not, like a bill of exchange or promissory note, a negotiable
instrument ...... .Lord Campbell in Gurney v. Behrend, 3 El & BI. 622, 633-34,
118 Eng. Rep. 1275, 1279 (Q.B. 1854).
4 E.g., the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and the Federal Bills of Lading Act, 39 Stat.
538-45 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 81-124 (1958).
" See part II infra, p. 17, on negotiation of bill of lading.
5 Scrutton, op. cit. supra note 14, at 10.
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are imposed by rules of law arising both from statutes51 and decided
cases. The bill does serve one of its most important functions how-
ever as evidence of this contract and as Scrutton observes: "When
indorsed, it is the only evidence.""
While it may seem somewhat startling, and perhaps incongruous,
that such an important item as the contract of carriage is in such
vague form, scattered as it is among rules of law, custom, and pieces
of paper, it should be realized that most cargo owners are fully
cognizant of the terms of shipment in the field in which they operate
and are well aware of the implications of the sources of the rules
relating to their contracts. The carrier, of course, is in no worse
position.
2. As a Receipt for the Goods
Probably the first use of the bill of lading was as a receipt by the
carrier that he had received on board the goods described therein. It
remains the same today;53 that is, it serves as an acknowledgement
by the carrier of receipt of certain goods. It will state the quality of
the goods, number of pieces, weight, and a statement as to their
condition at the time at which they are received. It is prima facie
evidence only, however, and parol evidence is admissible to show
discrepancies."
There are many different rules in relation to the receipt phase of
the bill of lading but as this work will not deal with this facet of the
bill in its main part, it is thought that a reference to some of the
authorities in the footnote herein will provide a starting place, at
least, for one interested in pursuing this particular topic further."
3. As a Document of Title
It will be remembered that in subsection 1 it was mentioned that
there are two main classifications of bills of lading, the straight bill
and the order bill. It is the latter type which interests us for the
most part, but it will be helpful to dispose of the former first.
Once the shipper delivers the goods to the carrier and receives
from him a bill of lading, not only does the bill now act as a receipt
for the goods and contain the terms of the contract of carriage, but
it informs the carrier generally what he can do with it, depending
5'Cogsa, 49 Stat. 1207-13 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1300-15 (1958); the Harter Act,
27 Stat. 445-46 (1893), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 190-95 (1958); and the "Fire Statute," Rev.
Stat. § 4282 (1875), 46 U.S.C.A. § 182 (1958), are a few examples.
" Scrutton, op. cit. supra note 14, at 10 n.(d).
" As is evidenced by 39 Stat. 541-42 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. 55 100-02 (1958).
"The Delaware, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 579 (1871).
"Hotchkiss, Bills of Lading, ch. 2 (1928); Porter, Bills of Lading, ch. 2-3 (1891);
Scrutton, op. cit. supra note 14, at 10-13.
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on the form it takes. If it is a straight bill, then prima facie the
consignee named therein is the owner of the goods. As such is the
case, the carrier is the agent of the consignee and risk of loss shifts
from the consignor to him. In practice, when the goods reach their
destination, the consignee produces the bill of lading and takes
delivery of them.
While it is obvious that the straight bill of lading is not a negoti-
able document-lacking even the words of negotiability "order" or
"bearer"-there is always the possibility of an assignment. If, in such
a case, the holder of such a straight bill transfers it to another, there
is no doubt, on strict common-law principles, that the transferee
can take no more than his transferor had." Of course, the transferee
takes title to the goods as against the transferor. And, if the transferee
notifies the carrier of his new interest, he becomes the obligee of
any obligations that may have been owing by the carrier to the
transferor." However, as mentioned above, when the goods are
delivered by the shipper to the carrier and a straight bill of lading
is issued, then prima facie the consignee becomes the owner of the
goods; if such proves true, then the assignment by the consignor of
the straight bill, even to a bona fide assignee, will be of no use to
the latter in respect to the goods themselves. If the assignment is made
by the consignee in such an instance, then of course the assignee is
in a much more favorable position. The best explanation of the
assignment of the straight bill of lading is the observation by Hotch-
kiss that "assignment on, and delivery of the bill of lading are of
no greater force than would be a separate bill of sale. . .. "
Turning now to the second category of bills of lading, the order
bill, a different situation is encountered. Here, one finds reference to
negotiation rather than assignment or transfer, and it is only natural
that negotiability opens up a much wider field. Something of the
mechanics of shipment ought to be kept in mind in pursuing this
topic. It is basically a simple procedure and one not difficult to
understand; nevertheless, it is important to realize what has happen-
ed. Very simply stated, the consignor delivers goods to a carrier and
receives from him, after such delivery, an (in this instance) order
bill of lading which acts as a receipt and as evidence of the contract
of carriage. The shipper then may do a number of things with his
bill but the most usual procedure is for him to go to his bank and
draw a bill of exchange on the consignee, attach this to the bill of
5' Based, primarily, on the "nemo dat quod non habet" thesis.
5 739 Stat. 543 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. § 112 (1958).
"SHotchkiss, op. cit. supra note 55, at 83.
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lading, and receive in exchange for these documents an advance
from the bank. The bank will then forward the two bills (coupled,
in all probability, with the invoice) to another bank at the consignee's
place of business. This agency bank will then contact the consignee,
inform him of the situation, and the consignee will accept the bill
of exchange if he approves, and receive from the bank the bill of
lading. With this document in hand he may of course go to the
carrier, surrender it, and claim the goods. It may be however, and
frequently such is the case, that at the time of receiving the bill of
lading, the goods are still in transit. Can the consignee dispose of the
goods by disposing of the document of title, the bill of lading? The
affirmative reply which this question has received has benefited
commercial practice a great deal.5"
The problem which is immediately presented then is this: What
are the rights of the transferee, the holder, of this bill? What may
he do with it? What position does he occupy? The answer to these
problems was very succinctly stated some seventy-five years ago by
an outstanding English jurist:
The law as to indorsement of bills of lading is as clear as in my opinion
the practice of all European merchants is thoroughly understood. A
cargo at sea while in the hands of the carrier is necessarily incapable of
physical delivery. During this period of transit and voyage, the bill of
lading by the law merchant is universally recognized as its symbol,
and the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading operates as a
symbolical delivery of the cargo. Property in the goods passes by such
indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading, whenever it is the in-
tention of the parties that the property should pass, just as under simi-
lar circumstances the property would pass by an actual delivery of
goods. And for the purpose of passing such property in the goods
and completing the title of the indorsee to full possession thereof, the
bill of lading, until complete delivery of the cargo has been made on
shore to someone rightfully claiming under it, remains in force as a
symbol, and carries with it not only the full ownership of the goods,
but also all rights created by the contract of carriage between the
shipper and the shipowner."0
It is clear that the indorsee of the bill of lading gets not only the
property in the goods represented by the bill, but also the rights
extant under the bill between the original owner, the shipper, and
the carrier. Can he get any more? The policy of the common law
has always been that a transferee gets only what his transferor had
and yet an exception to this has been made in some instances, notably
in the field of bills of exchange. It is common knowledge that an
" Gilmore and Black, Admiralty 91 (1957).
"
0 Bowen, L.J. in Sanders v. Maclean, (1883) 11 Q.B. 327, 341.
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indorsee of a negotiable bill or note can take such an instrument and
stand in an even more favored position than the indorser."' The
concept of holding in due course forms the backbone of the law of
negotiable instruments. Is the same now to be said of the order bill
of lading?
While it is possible to find, as courts have done for many years,
that "convenience of commerce . .. has allowed . . . an effect at
variance with the ordinary principles of law,"" such a stand must
be approached with considerable caution. In fact, it can be categori-
cally stated that the law does not proceed as far along the path of
negotiability in bills of lading as it does in bills of exchange. Notice,
for example, the caveat in the quotation from Sanders v. Maclean,
"whenever it is the intention of the parties that the property should
pass. . . ." Similarly, the position of the indorsee of the order bill of
lading depends entirely, as far as property rights in the goods are
concerned, on the title of the transferor. If he had no title to the
goods, no rights in them, then the transferee can acquire no title or
rights as against the true owner. A large gap thus appears in the
comparison of bills of lading with bills of exchange. Can it be said
then, in this light, that the bill of lading is a negotiable instrument
as is often claimed? The words "negotiation" and "negotiability"
generally conjure up in one's mind the immediate thought of that
situation wherein the transfer of an instrument gives a transferee
the possibility of acquiring more than his transferor had. 3 Certainly
such is the case in the field of bills and notes. It must be stated, how-
ever, that order bills of lading do not fit entirely into this picture,
for as has been remarked, "a bill of lading is 'negotiable' only in a
popular, and not in a technical sense.""4 That is, it may be indorsed
and delivered and property rights thereby transferred, but the
negotiation does not then erect a shield behind which the holder can
find shelter as is the case in the negotiation of a bill of exchange or
promissory note." In fact, there is, with almost complete certainty
61 See Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 57.
62Tindal, C.J. in Jenkyns v. Usborne, 7 Man. & G. 678, 699, 135 Eng. Rep. 273,
281 (C.P. 1844).
63"[I]t is the capability of conferring on a bona fide holder for value a better title
than that of his transferor which would appear to be the real test of negotiability."
Goodeve, Personal Property 266 (7th ed. 1937).
64Scrutton, op. cit. supra note 14, at 193 n.1.
6Many states have enacted legislation providing that bills of lading are negotiable
instruments and are to be treated "in the same manner as bills of exchange and promissory
notes." Erie & P. Dispatch v. St. Louis Cotton Compress Co., 6 Mo. App. 172 (1878),
quoting from Wags. Stats. 220, §§ 6-7. The construction of these statutory provisions by
the courts has placed them in a position, however, which their language would not seem to
indicate. It would perhaps be best to classify bills of lading-when comparing them with
bills of exchange and promissory notes-as does Professor Aigler, that is, as "quasi-ne-
gotiable instruments." Aigler, Bills and Notes 11 (1955).
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at the common law at least, only one instance in which the true nature
of the term "negotiable" can be said to apply to order bills of lading
and that is in the case where a stoppage in transitu is involved. This
requires some explanation.
It has been the practice of the common law for many years to
allow stoppage in transit of the goods by the unpaid seller upon the
insolvency of the buyer-consignee. This is a protective device of
which the seller may take advantage at any time within the transit
period. This right is subject to one exception which has direct bear-
ing on the problem at hand. That is, if the goods have been shipped
on an order bill of lading and this has been transferred by indorse-
ment and delivery to a person who is bona fide as to the insolvency
of the original buyer, then this right of stoppage in transitu is lost
to the shipper." In other words, what is encountered here is a right
being given to a person who is now the owner of the goods by virtue
of his holding the bill of lading in the manner in which he does,
which would not have been given to the person who was the original
buyer. In this situation, it may correctly be said that the order bill
of lading is truly a negotiable instrument, but there are great doubts
that such a nomenclature can be given to the bill under any other
circumstances."
In summary, there is no doubt that a bill of lading, be it an order
or a straight bill, is a document of title in view of the fact that
transfer of it may transfer the property in the goods which it repre-
sents. That it is a negotiable instrument as a bill of exchange and a
promissory note are negotiable instruments, except for the stoppage
in transitu feature, is simply not correct at the common law if the
common meaning of negotiation is in mind. It is only to be con-
sidered a negotiable instrument in all cases if the term is used solely
to describe the process of transferring property in goods by in-
dorsement and delivery of the bill of lading." If this definition is
86 This is codified now in many states of the United States in the Uniform Sales Act
5 57; in England in the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., C. 71, § 39(1) (b); and
in Canada in 'the Sale of Goods Act of many of the Provinces.
"
7See the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, § 47; Uniform Sales
Act § 62.
6See statement to this effect by Willes, J. in Fuentes v. Montis, (1868) 3 C.P. 268,
276. It should be kept in mind that this viewpoint is expressive only of the situation
at common law.
6"The enactment in the United States of the Pomerene Act, 39 Stat. 538-45 (1916),
49 U.S.C.A. §§ 81-124 (1958), and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act in some of the
states has changed this picture somewhat. The older common-law view has given way
in this country to what has been called a "mercantile view." See Void, Sales 335 (1959);
Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 212, 226 n.105 (1958). By these statutes, a broader scheme
of negotiability is presented and, in effect, an indorsee can be placed in a better position
than his indorser. It may be said, however, that although these acts more closely align
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kept in mind, it will be fruitful to proceed to the first conflict of
law problem which will be confronted, the question of negotiability
of a bill of lading from a conflict of law viewpoint.
II. NEGOTIATION OF THE BILL OF LADING
A. What Law Determines Negotiability?
To narrow the scope of this field to an area which will include
only those topics which present conflict of law problems is a step
which must first be taken. In order to accomplish this it is necessary
to divide bills of lading into three categories: (1) Bills covering
intrastate shipments; (2) Bills covering interstate shipments and
shipments from a state of the United States to a foreign port; and
(3) Foreign shipments.
1. Bills Covering Intrastate Shipments
This category is of no moment in the area under consideration.
As the shipment originates and ends in the same state and as the bill
is issued in that jurisdiction, no conflict of law problem is presented
in a question of negotiability. It is possible, of course, that negotiation
of the bill may subsequently take place in another state, but that is
of no concern here. '
2. Bills Covering Interstate Shipments and Shipments from a State
of the United States to a Foreign Port
In the second category the conflict problem could very easily arise
were it not for legislation concerning these very types of shipments.
Since 1916, when Congress enacted the Federal Bills of Lading
Act 1 (popularly named the Pomerene Act) no possibility of a con-
flict of law question can arise as to the negotiability of a bill of
lading."
the bill of lading with the bill of exchange, complete uniformity is not present. "We
assume . . . that negotiable instruments of the first class-i.e., those representing interests
in property-are not within the purview of the statute, [Negotiable Instruments Law]
however broad its title. Other acts, more restricted in scope, deal with bills of lading . . .
instruments quasi-negotiable, if not negotiable altogether." Cardozo, J. in President and
Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926). As this
work deals with the problem of negotiability and negotiation not solely from a base in
the United States, it is perhaps best to bear in mind that the common-law viewpoint and
the "mercantile" viewpoint have achieved varying success depending upon the jurisdiction
involved.
" It is even unlikely that negotiations under such circumstances will take place out-
side that state. See Stumberg, Commercial Paper and the Conflict of Laws, 6 Vand. L.
Rev. 489, 499 (1953).




The third category brings the conflict of law problems into play,
completely unhampered by legislative enactments. Unlike Cogsa, the
Pomerene Act does not apply to shipments coming to -the United
States from a foreign port. Hence, conflict of law rules, and partic-
ularly choice of law rules, must be considered.
While it was said previously73 that a bill of lading is not a negotiable
instrument in the sense in which a bill of exchange or promissory
note is said to be, still the word "negotiable" does mean, in its
reference to bills of lading, transferable by indorsement and delivery
or delivery alone. And certainly most business men would agree that
they have always treated a bill of lading as a negotiable instrument
in this restricted sense. Considering these facts, and remembering
that the indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading can transfer title
to the goods, it may be wise to think about the possibilities of using,
in the bill of lading cases, the conflict of law rules concerning
negotiability which are pertinent to bills and notes."4
If this comparison idea is kept in mind, it will be in order to
investigate now the possible choice of law rules applicable to the
negotiability question as it concerns a bill of lading. Although it is
theoretically possible to add more,75 there are three main laws, the
selection of any one of which could be said to be logically correct as
"the" applicable law to govern this question. Those three are: the
place of delivery, i.e., that place where the goods are to be delivered
to the consignee; the place of issue (or, as the Restatement puts it,
the place of making); and, the place as selected by the parties.
a. Place of Delivery.-During the sea voyage from a foreign port
to a port in the United States, it is somewhat difficult to say that at
any given point the contract is being performed to such an extent
that that place could be considered the place of performance. Accord-
ingly, it may be somewhat logical, perhaps expedient, to conclude
that the place of delivery is the place of performance, for it is there
the contract of carriage is going to be ultimately performed. And,
too, the place of performance as the applicable law to govern other
contracts is a selection that has been made many times before.76 Cases
considering the negotiability of bills of exchange have likewise
73 Supra note 68.
" As Robinson remarks, "[T]he bill of lading is 'negotiable' in a manner approxi-
mating that in which a bill of exchange is 'negotiable' but leaves the analogy incom-
plete." Robinson, Admiralty 581 n.261 (1939).
7' The law of the flag, for example.
76See, e.g., Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 124 (1882); Dixon v. Dun-
ham, 114 111, 324 (1853).
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selected this as being the correct law." The chief obstacle to an
application of such a theory in contract cases, i.e., that there may
be more than one place of performance, is not present in the case
of bills of lading since shipments to different ports are usually
handled by as many bills as there are destinations. Viewed in the
light of these considerations, the place of delivery as a selection of
the applicable law is justifiable.
b. Place of Issue.-The principal argument against using the place
of issue as the applicable rule in other contract cases is that such a
place may be purely fortuitous."m This argument is of no moment
here as the circumstances which give rise to happenstance claims in
other contract cases do not arise in bills of lading cases."9 The chief
factor in favor of selecting the place of issue rule leans strongly
toward its adoption; that is, the certainty and resulting predictability
of the governing law. Continuing with the analogy to bills and notes,
it is not difficult to find a great many cases which hold that the law
of the place of contracting governs the negotiability of such instru-
ments." It should be noted, however, that in the great majority of
these cases where it has been held that the lex loci contractus is the
correct law, the contract was to be performed at the place of issue
also. It is submitted that if the question of negotiability is a matter
which concerns form alone, then it is immaterial whether there are
different places of contracting and performance or whether the same
place is the scene of both functions, for questions of form are nearly
always relegated to the place of making.8' However, it is difficult to
solve the problem so easily, for it is perhaps much more realistic to
say that a question of negotiability is not a question of form, but
rather a question of the effect or obligation under a contract.8 Such
being the case, it is certainly much more important to separate place
of performance from place of making and distinguish between them.
"Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116 (1891); Sykes v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 78 Kan. 688,
98 Pac. 206 (1908); Stevens v. Gregg, 12 S.W. 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1890).
7" The oft-used examples of contracts concluded on a train or in a high-flying air-
plane provide startling, but novel, points of argument. More concrete criticism is con-
tained in Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 Yale
L.J. 565, 655 (1921) and 31 id. 53; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, 231-32 (1951).
7" As bills of lading are signed after the goods are placed on board ship, or in today's
modern practice where a carrier who has a large fleet does not always know beforehand
what vessel will be available to carry these goods and consequently the bill is signed upon
delivery to the carrier, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the bill of lading would
be issued in a place other than that where the goods are handed over.
"See, e.g., Howenstein v. Barnes, 12 Fed. Cas. 711 (No. 6786) (C.C.D.Kan. 1870);
Utah State Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 180 Cal. 1, 179 Pac. 160 (1919); Strawberry Point Bank
v. Lee, 117 Mich. 122, 75 N.W. 444 (1898); Lebel v. Tucker, (1867) 3 Q.B. 77.
"'Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 406 (1875). Contra, Hall v.
Cordell, 142 U.S. 116 (1891).
aNote, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 753 (1913).
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When it comes to questions of the obligation assumed under a con-
tract, the place of performance has, no doubt, much more to offer
than any other; and the courts, of course, have realized this and the
law of the place of performance has been the overwhelming choice
in such cases. 8 It must still be kept in mind, however, that there
are many cases which have selected the law of the place of making
as the proper law to govern negotiability of bills of exchange8 and of
promissory notes, and it will be seen shortly just what effect such a
choice has had on the negotiability problem in its connection with
bills of lading.
c. Place Selected by the Parties.-The subject of autonomy in the
contracts field has received wide attention from many able writers "
in the past few years, and while it certainly cannot be said that the
picture is altogether clear, at least as the smoke clears away a sharper
focus is being made possible. The Vita Foods case" no doubt was
largely responsible for this upswing in interest, but many later cases
have contributed to it as well. "7 Autonomy usually means express
selection by the parties of the law which they wish to govern the
validity of their contract." Express selection, however, is not the
only place from which intention as to proper law arises. Intention
may be presumed as well. It will be more profitable to look first at
the presumption of intention.
Many American cases which have wrestled with the problem of
negotiability of instruments have adopted the applicable law on the
basis that this was the law the parties must have had in mind when
they made the contract. The presumption is almost always applied
within the bounds of place of performance or place of making.
Usually, the facts of the particular case so balance out that the
court selects one or the other as having more points of contact and,
therefore, being the place which the parties must have had in mind
when they entered into the contract or, at least, the place which the
court would have selected if placed in the position of the parties."
'3 See Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
79, 194, 260 (1909).
84 Supra note 80.
85 See notes 5, 6, 7 supra.
8 Vita Food Prod., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277, noted, 7 Camb.
L.J. 265 (1940), 40 Colum. L. Rev. 518 (1940), 3 Modern L. Rev. 61 (1939).
8Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Cent. Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948); Hal
Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1946).
8Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, I Am. J. Comp. L. 341, at 343 (1952),
contains various definitions of autonomy. The intention may come from express stipula-
tion, tacit agreement, or from the circumstances present.
"See, e.g., McCornick & Co. v. Tolmie Bros., 46 Idaho 544, 269 Pac. 96 (1928);
Midland Steel Co. v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 34 Ind. App. 107, 72 N.E. 290 (1904).
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In some instances the parties will stipulate expressly what law they
wish to govern their contract. This is rather a rarity in the bills and
notes field, but is quite common in the case of bills of lading. The
validity and effect of such stipulations is a very important subject in
the area of contractual limitation of liability and will be gone into in
some detail in a later section of this work," but it should be mention-
ed in passing here that selection by the parties as to governing law
can take its place as a choice of law rule for determining the nego-
tiability of the bill of lading. The Uniform Commercial Code, for
example, permits agreement by the parties as to what law shall
govern provided there is some connection with the selected jurisdic-
tion. 1 Some believe that this is an advantageous provision and should
be encouraged, 2 but it must be stated that the weight of authority is
decidedly contrary to such a provision 3 and there is no doubt that
its importance is greatly to be questioned, particularly in maritime
matters. Nevertheless, it is a possibility for a choice of law rule and
must be taken into consideration in any compilation of such rules.
Having considered the three main possibilities, it is pertinent now
to select the one most useful for bills of lading, considering par-
ticularly what the courts have actually done. The cases are very
few on this matter, and in the reports and treatises there is really
only one rule which has received any recognition in the field. The
most recent textual treatment of the law of admiralty,"' in a section
devoted exclusively to the conflict of laws problem in bills of lading,
deals very summarily with the problem by simply saying that "the
validity and negotiability of the bill [will be determined] by the
jurisdiction in which the bill was issued."" A very recent law review
article, in referring to the only case which has been found directly
on the point,9 puts it somewhat tersely: "Whether an ocean bill is
negotiable is determined by the law of the place of its issue.""
It may thus be summarized that while there are three possibilities
presented in answer to the question of which is the correct law to
govern negotiability of a bill of lading, only one has received any
judicial recognition, viz, the place of issue. It should be borne in
mind, however, first that a stipulation as to the applicable law can
0 To be discussed in the concluding part of the Article in the next issue of the Journal.
"Uniform Commercial Code § 1-105.
"' See, e.g., Stumberg, supra note 70, at 503-04.
" See, e.g., E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cit. 1931).
" Gilmore and Black, Admiralty (1957).
95 Id. at 114.
"' Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 123 Misc. 806, 206 N.Y. Supp.
413 (1924).
" Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 212, 222 (1958).
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be an important factor particularly in the six states which have
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code,"s and this may perhaps be
true elsewhere if adherence is had to the view of some legal writers.
Second, from a purely logical stand, place of performance is as
sound a choice as place of issue. With such a paucity of case law the
matter cannot be said to be a really important or controversial one;
place of issue is certainly in first place in any collation of choice of
law rules, but it must be remembered that this is a matter which
has received very little judicial attention and it cannot be said to be
at all settled. It may perhaps be wise to remember that there is a
possibility of close analogy here to the negotiability problem in the
bills of exchange field; and in that field it is not at all possible to
conclude that only one law governs negotiability in all jurisdictions.
Thus, an open mind on the question of negotiability in bills of lading
cases cannot be too strongly advocated as a careful position.9
One further point remains for discussion arising from the analogy
of the bill of lading to the bill of exchange or promissory note. It
has been held in many cases that the indorsement of either of the
latter two is a separate contract to be treated apart from the con-
tract of, for example, the drawer or the maker.' ° Such being the case,
many courts have held that in an action to determine the liability of
an indorser, the correct law to be applied is the law of the place of
indorsement even though such a jurisdiction would normally follow
the law of the place of making in other matters."1 To illustrate: If
a bill of exchange were drawn in England, payable in France, and
negotiated in New Jersey, while an Oklahoma court might determine
negotiability of the instrument from the place of making standpoint
when liability of the drawer is in question, if the case concerns the
liability of the indorser, it might conceivably apply the law of New
Jersey. The somewhat anomalous situation thus results that if per-
chance the instrument would be nonnegotiable according to English
law, this would have no effect on the liability of the indorser if the
instrument were a negotiable one according to New Jersey law."'
Should this same theory be applied to bills of lading?
" Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island.
" The Negotiable Instruments Law, which has had universal acceptance in the United
States, provides no solution to the conflict of law problem as regards negotiability. As
it will be pointed out later that a close analogy with the bills and notes field is ad-
vantageous, the "open mind" technique is here advocated for bills of lading.
... See, e.g., Smith v. Zabel, 86 Ind. App. 310, 157 N.E. 551 (1927); Note, 11 Calif.
L. Rev. 114 (1923).
101 Ibid.
'0' See, e.g., MacIntosh v. Gibbs, 79 N.J.L. 40, 74 AtI. 708 (1909). Cf. Hyatt v. Bank
of Kentucky, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 193 (1871).
[Vol. 1 $
CONFLICT OF LAW
There have been no cases found dealing with this particular point
and all one can do is resort to the long-suffering ally of analogy. It
is submitted in this regard that analogy to bills of exchange and
promissory notes is the only available source upon which to draw.
The real problem therein is that no one rule has been established;
nevertheless, help is forthcoming even out of conflicting opinions.
It appears that while the issue is still somewhat in doubt, the pre-
vailing rule, as stated above, is that each individual contract will
be treated separately and according to local law. This rule has re-
ceived most of the attention and is prevalent not only in the United
States "' but, apparently, in England as well."' The situation is
evidently the reverse in Continental Europe, to add to the con-
fusion. °5
It can only be said that there is a certain advantage to be gained
by telling merchants that when they accept bills of lading as in-
dorsees they will be governed in their dealings by the law with which
they are most familiar and thus advocate the adoption of the rule
which has found most favor in the Anglo-American law of bills and
notes. It is only fair to remark, however, that such a selection might
conceivably lead to a lessening of the sought-after state of free
circulation of negotiable paper. Whether such a result would follow
is, of course, purely conjectural; thus, it is thought that the better
rule to follow, at least in the United States and England, is the same
as is adhered to in the bills and notes field, if only for some measure
of continuity and uniformity.
B. Has There Been A Due Negotiation?
Once it has been ascertained that the instrument under considera-
tion is negotiable by reference to the proper law,' the problem
remains (where the instrument changes hands) whether a "due
negotiation"" ' has been accomplished. It should be mentioned at the
outset that one should be careful in distinguishing the question of
the validity of a negotiation from the problems concerning the effects
103 See the cases collected in Annot., 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) 672 (1908); Annot., 61
L. R. A. 212 (1903).
.04 See Koechlin et cie. v. Kestenbaum Bros., (1927) 1 K.B. 889; Goodwin v. Robarts,
(1876) 45 L.J. Ex. (n.s.) 748. Notice, in the latter case, how particular reference is
made to section 72 of the English Bills of Exchange Act (1882). See also Embiricos v.
Anglo-Austrian Bank, (1905) 1 K.B. 677.
See Note, 11 Calif. L. Rev. 114, 116 (1922).106 Supra p. 17.
10' "Due negotiation" means only that the proper steps for investing an indorsee with
the rights to which he is entitled by law have been followed. See, e.g., 39 Stat. 542-43
(1916), 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-08 (1958).
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of a negotiation. It is the former that now must be investigated.' 8
To state the problem in more detail: Once the instrument which has
been found to be negotiable passes by some means from one to
another, by the mechanical steps involved in this transfer, has there
been a negotiation of the document which is effective when viewed
in the light of the proper law to govern the question of validity of
negotiation?
The question can best be approached by a categorization of the
different factual situations possible. For the purpose of ascertaining
all of the applicable choice of law rules it is necessary in this instance
to assemble the possibilities in four groups and deal with each
separately.
1. Intrastate Shipments
When goods are shipped from one point in a state to another
point also within that state, it is obvious that questions of conflict
of laws are very scarce, for no matter which of the many available
choice of law rules is chosen by the court it will result in the same
governing law. As was pointed out earlier,"9 the possibility of negotia-
tion in another state of a bill of lading covering such shipment is
a remote one. If this happened, however, and it is the happening
of such unpredictable events which leads to the making of law, then
the problem should be resolved upon the following basis: If both
states involved are jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Bills
of Lading Act (some twenty-eight have) "' then no conflict problem
arises. If neither or only one has such legislation then the analogy to
bills of exchange provides a suitable answer, i.e., the place of transfer
or negotiation will determine whether there has been a valid negotia-
tion of the document."
The argument might immediately be raised that it appears some-
what anomalous to say that the place of issue should determine negoti-
ability of the instrument and then leave this place and shift to
another place of negotiation to ascertain if this negotiable document
has been, in fact, validly negotiated. It might, in the interests of
certainty or continuity, be argued that the same place, e.g, the place
of issue, should govern both of these aspects as they are so closely
related. There is some merit in this thesis and it stems from the idea
that once a jurisdiction has fastened onto a piece of paper the fact
19A discussion on the effects of negotiation follows in the next section, p. 30,
infra.10, See p. 17 supra, and note 70.
.°A compilation of those states which have enacted the Uniform Bills of Lading Act
may be found in 4 Uniform Laws Ann. (1922).
... United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934).
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that it is negotiable in character, this character should travel with it
wherever it goes. Further, since the first jurisdiction gave it this
character, it gave it as well the power to be negotiated. As this power
is impressed on the instrument, the law which created it should also
be the law which governs its accompanying effects, negotiation
being one.
This argument is not a novel one in some fields, for stock transfer
cases have been dealt with on this basis,11 but it is submitted that it is
not the most advantageous solution in the area of negotiable bills of
lading. The reason will appear, it is hoped, from a survey of all of
the categories presently under discussion, but it must be mentioned
here that uniformity is desirable in the entire area, and the place of
issue rule simply will not satisfy all the needs. A concrete and valid
criticism of the argument for the place of issue rule is that those who
advocate such a theory tend to forget that these two processes, i.e., the
ascertaining first of the negotiable character of an instrument and
second, its valid negotiation, are two entirely different and separable
functions. In the first case, when deciding upon negotiability, a
court is interested in only the original parties and what they have
and have not done. The court is, in other words, attempting to find
what form the contract takes. When the negotiation of the instru-
ment is up for interpretation, however, the court is interested in an
entirely new contract altogether, that arising from the negotiation of
the instrument. As there are two separate concepts here to be con-
sidered, it is not at all surprising that two separate jurisdictions each
have control over one."' After all, this is not a new thing to the
field of conflict of laws; in the area of contracts generally it is very
much accepted that the lex loci contractus will govern formalities of
the contract and the lex loci solutionis govern the details of its per-
formance."54 In this very limited area of intrastate shipments then,
where negotiation of the bill has taken place outside that state, and
eliminating the more than half of the states of the United States
which have enacted the Uniform Bills of Lading Act as producing
no conflict problem, it is submitted that the place of negotiation is
the proper law to govern the valid negotiation of the instrument.
"'See, e.g., Morson v. Second Nat'l Bank, 306 Mass. 588, 29 N.E.2d 19 (1940).
113 As well, it was pointed out in the previous section that it is the practice of Anglo-
American courts to separate questions dealing with the liability of drawers from the
liability of indorsers, even so far as to those dealing with negotiability.
'This, of course, is not universally acceptable; more theories are prevalent in the
contracts sphere than in any other branch of the conflict of laws. Nevertheless, it re-
mains true that different places govern various aspects of a contract, no matter what




This is an area very similar to the first in one respect; that is,
conflict of law problems are very scarce. (It should be mentioned
that no case has been found which deals with a conflict problem
under either of these two headings.) It is only natural that one should
expect to find conflict of law problems in cases involving two or
more of the United States but here they simply do not exist if the
entire transaction remains inside the United States. Some explanation
is in order.
Prior to 1916, conflicts problems could arise in the situation where
there had been a transfer of a negotiable bill of lading which covered
an interstate shipment. In that year, however, Congress passed the
Pomerene Act.' and virtually abolished the possibility of any con-
flicts problems. This statute deals with, inter alia, interstate ship-
ments on common carriers and sets up a procedure to be followed
for negotiation of bills of lading thereunder.' If one follows this
course, then a valid negotiation will be effected. As this statute super-
sedes all state law on this subject,'17 it is obvious that, regardless of the
state in which negotiation is undertaken, conformance with the
Pomerene Act is necessary. The law is the same then for such ship-
ments in all states and any conflicting law is impossible.
This leaves only one possibility for consideration under this head-
ing, and that is the very remote case where there is a bill of lading
covering a shipment from, e.g., California to New York, through
the Panama Canal, and the bill of lading is indorsed and delivered
to an indorsee in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Very summarily, it is
submitted that the same rule should apply here as was recommended
in the case of the intrastate shipment, viz, reference to the law of
the place of negotiation to determine the validity of the negotiation.
Exactly the same reasoning could, and should, apply.
3. Shipment from a State in the United States to a Foreign Port
The Pomerene Act applies not only to interstate shipments but to
shipments from a port in a state of the United States to a foreign
port as well.1 ' If there is a negotiation of this bill of lading in a state
of the United States, there is no problem of choosing the correct
choice of law rule to govern validity of negotiation; compliance must
be had with the provisions of the Pomerene Act.
115 39 Stat. 538-45 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. § B1-124 (1958).
... 39 Stat. 542-43 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. 5 107-08 (1958).
117Teller & Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 78 Pa. Super. Ct. 300 (1922).
... Unlike the Harter Act and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the Pomerene Act
does not apply to shipments inbound to the United States from a foreign nation, as will
be discussed beginning on page 27 infra.
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While it was mentioned previously"' in the category dealing with
interstate shipments that negotiation in a foreign nation of a bill
of lading covering interstate shipments would be exceedingly rare,
this does not apply to foreign negotiation of bills which are issued
to cover shipments abroad from the United States. It is not difficult
to conceive of a shipment from Boston, Massachusetts to Liverpool,
England and a negotiation of the bill in England or perhaps even in
France. It is here that more difficulty is encountered and an argu-
ment which was made earlier becomes pertinent again (that the
impression of a negotiable character on an instrument by the law
of State A should be so fastened on the instrument that, the power
being created by State A, State B has no control over it, even though
negotiation is alleged in State B).
Not only is it possible to make out just as rational an argument
for the place of negotiation rule here as it was in the previous cate-
gory, but here as well it can be said that the transfer of the bill of
lading only is intended to transfer the goods which it represents.
Thus, might it not be possible to say that the lex situs of the
chattel should control validity of negotiation, putting the argument
on the same Hohfeldian "power" basis? Once again, in the interests
of uniformity not only in the bills of lading field but in the field
of all negotiable instruments, it is submitted that the place of
negotiation is the proper place to decide upon the validity of the
negotiation. The fact that a separate contract is engendered by the
indorsement and delivery can only serve to buttress the argument in
favor of the law of the place of negotiation as the proper law.
4. Shipments from a Foreign Port to a State of the United States
and Shipments between Foreign Ports
As was mentioned above, the Pomerene Act does not apply to
either of these two cases. It must be noted, however, that this
categorical statement should be taken with some reservation in the
area of negotiation of bills of lading covering these types of ship-
ments. There are two possible groups of places where negotiations
of these bills may take place and the solution in each, while they
should correspond in result, perhaps can be pursued most advanta-
geously in a separate fashion. In the first place, the bill may be in-
dorsed and delivered in a state of the United States. The question most
pressing in such a situation is this: Is there any possibility of apply-
ing the provisions of the Pomerene Act to such a case? While there
is no known case which has dealt with this particular problem since
119 Supra p. 26.
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the enactment of the act, there is a decision .. a few years prior to
its adoption which may well have great influence on a modern case
with similar facts. It may do well to investigate this case in some
detail; the facts are quite simple.
A quantity of hides was purchased in Russia and shipped to
Massachusetts on an order bill of lading issued in Russia. The parties
stipulated that English law was to settle "any claims or question
between the owners of the goods and ship-owners. . . ..." . The bill
was indorsed and delivered in Massachusetts to a third party and
then was transferred to the plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser. As the
first indorsement was special in nature, the question arose as to the
status of the plaintiff. Is he precluded from dealing with the goods
except for the special purpose described in the indorsement, or is
he to be considered as taking free of this and being considered an
absolute owner? It is not difficult to see that this depends entirely on
the validity and effect of the negotiation of the bill to the plaintiff.
The thought immediately comes to mind that the stipulation as
to proper law in the bill of lading would settle the problem. English
law would say that the special indorsement passes no title to the
goods except for that special purpose, and that could be the end of
the matter."' The validity and effect of such stipulations will be
discussed at length in a later section of this work,23 but it is easily
disposed of here. If the case before the court here had been concerned
with the rights and obligations of the carrier, it is almost certain
that reference to English law would have been made." But, here,
the position of the carrier is not in issue. The only matter up for
litigation concerns the position of the plaintiff in his relationship to
certain goods covered by a bill of lading, and his contract is one
which is contained entirely within the confines of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. Accordingly, it is only Massachusetts law
which has any bearing on the validity of the negotiation of the bill
of lading. As Massachusetts had enacted the Uniform Bills of Lad-
ing Act prior to the hearing of this case, that statute governed and
according to its provisions
the validity of a negotiation of a bill is not impaired by the fact that
such negotiation was a breach of duty on the part of the person making
the negotiation, or by the fact that the owner of the bill was deprived
"' Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N.E. 1025 (1913).
12' 214 Mass. at 202, 100 N.E. at 1027.
122 See, e.g., Clerk v. Pigot, 12 Mod. 192, 88 Eng. Rep. 1256 (K.B. 1698).
12 To be discussed in the concluding portion of this Article.
12
4 in dictum, Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N.E. 1025 (1913),
disposes of this by saying, "With that stipulation, those rights and obligations must be
determined by the law of England, and our statutes have no bearing thereon."
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of the possession of the same by fraud, accident, mistake, duress or
conversion, if the person to whom the bill was negotiated . . . gave
value therefor, in good faith ....
The plaintiff, therefore, took a clear title to the goods which the
bill represented, and he did so by virtue of Massachusetts law.
This case is important in this area of the law for a number of
reasons. First, it is a case involving negotiation of a bill of lading
rather than a bill of exchange and bears out the theory of con-
tinuity and uniformity among all types of negotiable instruments
which, as expressed earlier, is a desirable aim, for it has been pointed
out that bills of exchange and promissory notes are to be governed,
on questions of validity of their negotiation, on the same theory. "
Second, it is a case which involves negotiation of a bill in the United
States which has otherwise foreign elements, so much so that today's
Pomerene Act has no application to it except for the possibility
(which must now be investigated) that because of the supersedence
of state statutes by this federal act,'M the federal act controls. It is
submitted that this is not the proper result. In cases where the ship-
ment is from a foreign port to a state in the United States, the
Pomerene Act has no application whatsoever. In such cases as the
Baker case today it would seem to follow that if the negotiation of
such a bill takes place in a state of the United States, the law of that
jurisdiction should apply to determine whether there has been a
valid negotiation and, if that state is one that has enacted the Uni-
form Bills of Lading Act, the provisions of that act will settle the
problem exactly as it was settled in the Baker case."8 If the state
does not have the Uniform Act, then to maintain uniformity the
suggestion is once again made that the conflict of law choice of law
rules relating to other negotiable instruments should be applied, and
the law of the place of negotiation brought to bear.
The second place at which negotiation may be had of a bill of
lading covering a shipment to the United States from a foreign
port or a shipment between foreign ports, is in a foreign nation.
Of course, the same arguments could be made here, that the law
of the place of issue should be called upon to settle questions not only
of negotiability but of validity of negotiations as well, but one can
only repeat the idea of separate contracts-issuing and transferring-
.. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 214, § 5 (1957).
". See Alcock v. Smith, (1892) 1 Ch. 238.
127See supra note 117.
"' Professor Stumberg reaches the same conclusion. Stumberg, Commercial Paper and
the Conflict of Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 489, at 503 n.39. See also Voghel v. New York,
N.H. & H. Ry., 216 Mass. 165, 103 N.E. 286 (1913).
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and that it takes different laws to construct these, as they take place
in different jurisdictions and are essentially different transactions.
Once again, the law of the place of transfer is suggested as the
proper law, from the standpoint of uniformity and from logical
necessity as well.
When one looks back over the field of negotiation and sees the
rule which is being followed in some of the categories outlined above,
and recommended in others, it should be obvious that a strong stand
is being taken on an analogy to other negotiable instruments. This
should not be thought of as a weakness or as a criticism that bills of
lading can not find their own niche and develop their own juris-
prudence; rather, this is to be considered an asset, for if merchants,
bankers, shippers, and carriers are to take faith in the instruments
they have developed and use, then the law must aid them in any way
it can. No better method can be suggested than that all of these
people be told that they may deal with a bill of lading as they can
with any other negotiable instrument, and conversely as well. If this
position is assumed, then the situation will be clarified at least to this
extent: The same choice of law rule will apply to all questions of
negotiation. It is evidently not going to be possible to eliminate the
conflict of law problem, but it is very possible to minimize the
doubts and dangers inherent in this particular area.
C. What Law Determines The Effects Of Negotiation?
Assuming that by the application of the proper law it has been
found that there has been a due negotiation of a negotiable instru-
ment, the problem then presents itself as one of result. That is, in
the wake of negotiation, what has the indorsee or transferee received
and what is his position in relation to others and to the goods? And
to hold the line to within striking distance of the purpose of this
work: By what law do you determine the answers to these questions?
It may be observed that there are two really separate and distinct
problems here. One concerns a "paper" right and the other a property
right. In more detail, once a person gains possession of an order bill
of lading, it might be said that his interest lies in two directions. He
is interested on the one hand in his property rights in the goods;
he asks, "Do I now own those goods because of my possession of a
document of title to them?" On the other hand, his interest also
is fixed on what rights he may have acquired because of his possible
position as a holder of this instrument. It is well known that the
holder, for example, of a bill of exchange may have radically dif-
ferent rights, perhaps vastly improved standing, from his transferor
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or from the previous parties.129 If he is in that class known as "holders
in due course," then he may now defeat some of the defenses to the
instrument that the other parties to it possess. In the investigation
of the position of the holder of a bill of lading, one should then ask:
Is he protected, because of his bona fide purcase, by a shield similar
to that which surrounds a holder in due course of a bill of exchange
or a promissory note, and 'what is his relationship to other parties to
the instrument? Finally, and of greatest importance in this instance,
what law determines these things, i.e., where does one look to find
these answers?
The first problem, dealing with the acquisition of property inter-
ests, is dealt with in the following section. The second, the "paper"
interest, will occupy but short space for description. Here it must be
determined if the taker by negotiation can hold the carrier to its
obligations under the bill, if he can further negotiate it, what his
rights are if he took from a thief or a finder, what his position is
before and after maturity of the bill, what warranties have been
made to him as an indorsee, and so on. All of these problems are
inherently connected with the negotiation itself and may be said to
form a class, simply denoted as the effects of negotiation. What the
answers to these questions are is beyond the scope of this Article, the
only question here being what law determines the answers to them.
It is now in order to investigate that problem.
Just as it was necessary to subdivide the area in the preceding
sections in order to reach valid conclusions, so it may be of aid here,
but it will be done less formally. It may simply be said that if the
bill covers an intrastate shipment no conflict problem usually pre-
sents itself. If it is an interstate shipment or a carriage from a state
in the United States to a foreign land and negotiation of the bill
in the United States, there is no problem either, as the provisions of
the Pomerene Act will apply and it has the answers to these
questions."0 If, however, negotiation of any of these bills is had in a
foreign jurisdiction, then choice of law rules must be applied.
Once more, the natural analogy to negotiable money instruments
comes to the fore. In that area it has been decided by the great weight
of authority that the law of the place of transfer or negotiation is the
proper law to determine the effects of such transfer or negotiation."1
It is submitted that such a step in the bills of lading field is only a
129 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 57; Uniform Commercial Code § 3-305.
13039 Stat. 543 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. § 111 (1958).
... United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934); Restatement, Conflict
of Laws 5 349 (1934). Cf. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-105.
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natural one and much to be desired in this situation where so many
gaps are present."'
If the bill covers a shipment from a foreign port to the United
States or between two foreign ports, and negotiation of such is made
in the United States, once again the inclination to apply the rules as
laid down in the Pomerene Act must be quickly brushed aside, and
an application made of local law. As was pointed out earlier,"'3 if
the state of negotiation is one having enacted the Uniform Bills of
Lading Act, then the result will be easy of solution. If not, then the
common rules of negotiation will have to apply, the analogy to bills
of exchange coming into play once again.
In conclusion, one can only reiterate the proposition that the
analogy to negotiable money instruments is a wise move and one
fruitful not only in its uniformity of results, but also in the com-
mercial efficacy which will ensue.
III. CREATION OF PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THE
GOODS BY TRANSFER OF THE BILL OF
LADING
A. Scope Of The Subject Matter Of This Section
When an owner of goods ships them from a port in the United
States to a port in England on board an ocean freighter, and that
freighter proceeds via the North Atlantic to its ultimate destination
in England by way of a brief stop in France, the factual situation
that must now be dealt with is made possible. If, during the course
of the movement of the goods from the dock in New York to the
dock in Liverpool, the consignor of the goods decides to sell them to
some person other than the consignee, this he is free to do, depending
on the contract between himself and the consignee and, too, between
the carrier and the shipper. Suppose that the consignor does enter
into a contract with an individual in Boston for the sale of the goods
which are, at that time, in transit. There are several problems which
can arise from this transaction, but the one most pertinent to this
Article is found in this question: What law determines whether the
title to the goods which are the subject of this sale has passed from
the shipper to his vendee?
.. Gilmore and Black, Admiralty 89 (1957): "Gaps exist in the law of documents
which have long since been filled in the law of instruments. As new problems arise in
the documentary field the natural analogy to which the courts turn is the more fully
developed law of money instruments."
133 5ee supra p. 24.
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It should be noted that, for purposes of illustration, no mention
of a bill of lading in connection with the shipment has been made.
If one assumes that there is no such bill, the conflict of law problem
is fairly well fixed in its place.
Many conflicting theories have been advanced through many years
of searching for the answer to the question of the correct choice of
law rule to govern the passage of title to movables.'" Some, naturally,
have more merit than others, but it may generally be said that pre-
sently one theory has filtered down through the rest and can be
called the predominant rule. As this section is not concerned with
this problem but only with that circumstance where a bill of lading
has been issued, it is thought sufficient to simply say that the lex
situs of the chattels will, generally, determine the effect of a purport-
ed transfer of title to those goods. A reference to the authorities
listed in the footnote will provide more light on this facet of the
problem of passage of title."5
The concern of this section may arise from the same set of facts
as given, combined with the additional fact of the issuance of a bill
of lading to cover a given shipment, and the transfer of the bill of
lading from the shipper to the transferee. It must now be asked, as
it was before: What law determines the effect of this transfer on the
title to the goods covered by the transferred bill? It will be seen
that because of the injection of this additional fact, many more
problems come into existence and while there are, as before, many
theories put forth on selection of the proper law, one cannot so
easily refer to any one rule as being predominant or more acceptable.
It is of course obvious that if the laws of the various connected
jurisdictions are not in conflict, or even if the laws of the two places
between which a selection must be made would lead to the same
result, then choice of law rules become superfluous."" It is in the
situation where, -e.g., the law of the place where the transfer of the
bill of lading is made and the law of the situs of the goods are such
as to give different results in a title dispute, that a selection must
be made and it is to that choice that we must now proceed.
... See note 13 5 infra.
... The outstanding work on this particular subject is Professor Beale's article, The
Situs of Things, 28 Yale L.J. 525 (1919). See Lalive, The Transfer of Chattels in the
Conflict of Laws (1955).
.. See, e.g., Freeman v. The East India Co., 5 B. & Ald. 617, 106 Eng. Rep. 1316
(K.B. 1822), where the two systems were English and Roman-Dutch. The Court chose
the lex situs; it really did not have to, the two systems yielding the same result. See
Wolff, Private International Law 513 (2d ed. 1950).
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B. Solutions To, The Problem
1. The Past Position
Historically, the law which governed the incidents of ownership
and the rights of property in chattels was best expressed in the Latin
phrase mobilia sequuntur personam. In other words, one might say
that the goods figuratively followed the owner wherever he went." '
If he owned goods in France, England, and the United States, the
fact of location of the goods in those jurisdictions had no bearing
whatsoever on the choice of the law to be applied to them. Only one
law could govern rights in them and that was the personal law of
the owner, the law of his domicile. As chattels were in the class
known as movables, they were capable of being moved about and
it might be very difficult if not impossible to discover their where-
abouts at any given time. When the element of chance was added,
that is, that at the time of a transaction involving them the goods
happened to be in State X in transit, then it is easy to see why the
maxim had the following it did. "
The principle has fallen into disuse now, however, chiefly due, as
Professor Cheshire puts it, to the fact "that it is untenable and un-
reasonable in all but the simplest cases."' 39
What law then is to be applied to determine the rights acquired
by a purported transfer of the property in goods by negotiation of a
bill of lading? It is submitted that from a consideration of the
various rules available, there are two choices which may be made.
An outline of each follows.
2. The Choices Today
As was pointed out in the first section of this discussion, the law
of the place in which the goods are situated at the time of the trans-
action which purports to effect a transfer of the title to them is
usually held to apply. This is certainly a rule which satisfies a major-
ity of fact situations involving more than one jurisdiction. It is
correct to say that the jurisdiction which has physical control of
the res is the one which should prescribe the methods of transferring
the title to it. As Professor Beale puts it, "It is a general principle
137,"[It is a clear proposition . . . that personal property has no locality. The mean-
ing of that is, not that personal property has no visible locality, but that it is subject
to that law which governs the person of the owner. With respect to the disposition of it,
with respect to the transmission of it, either by succession or by the act of the party, it
follows the law of the person." Lord Loughborough in Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. BI. 665,
126 Eng. Rep. 379, 392 (C.P. 1791).
38 See Story, Conflict of Laws § 380 (2d ed. 1880).
'39Cheshire, Private International Law 439 (5th ed. 1957). See, however, Liverpool
Marine Credit Co, v. Hunter, (1868) 3 Ch. App. 479.
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that the property actually within the terriory of a sovereign is freely
subject to his jurisdiction."' "
While the application of the lex situs is doubtless a valuable
tool and one which will satisfactorily resolve many of the problems
connected with the passage of title to chattels, when it is applied
to those fact situations which arise on the shipment of goods from
one place to another, numerous difficulties are immediately en-
countered. The most pervading question is that which immediately
comes to mind in nearly all of these cases and is the one which pro-
vides the most difficulty. To elucidate, in the fact situation which
was given in the beginning of this discussion, the shipment from
New York to Liverpool via French ports, how can a situs of the
goods at any one particular time be ascertained? When the ship is
in the mid-Atlantic, for example, suppose that the bill of lading is
negotiated to an indorsee in Boston. In determining whether the
latter now has title to the goods, reference must be had to some body
of law for the solution. It cannot be said that the law of the North
Atlantic is going to apply, yet that is where the goods actually are.
If the negotiation is had when the goods are still on the ship, but it
is docked in Cherbourg prior to its departure for England, then
while it is true that the situs can be definitely established as France,
can it rationally be said that the mere circumstance of the goods
being situate in France at the time of negotiation of the bill in
Massachusetts should be controlling? It is thought that these two
problems are the main hindrances to any arbitrary application of the
lex situs rule; application of the law of any place based on situs of
the goods, it is submitted, is reaching too far for uniformity in these
cases. It is very well to seek such a state, and everyone would like to
be able to point to one body of law and say that that is the law
which will govern every facet of this transaction. When such a
position is reached at the expense of logic, one can dismiss certain
apprehensions; but, when it is reached because of a bare disregard of
plain common sense, perhaps a search in another direction is in
order.
Two possibilities do exist which can settle this problem of choice
of law. One of them, the first to be considered, falls under the
criticism which is outlined in the preceding paragraph. The second
is proposed, not by any means as a new approach, for it has been
140 Beale, supra note 135, at 525. Savigny applies the lex situs but does so
because he is of the opinion that the owner of the goods has subjected them to that law.
Savigny, Private International Law 180 (1869); Wolff, op. cit. supra note 136, at 511,
refutes this as a mere fiction.
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well thought out prior to this time,"1 but as a much more rational
means of selection, and still, one that does not depart too far from
the uniform position which is much to be desired.
If a person were to defer to the proponents of strict uniformity,
he would of course select the lex situs as the proper law to determine
property rights in chattels. As this is sometimes difficult to do, as in
the mid-Atlantic scene, certain fictions have been developed and
proposed as solving these rather odd situations. These fictions are
five in number and it is proposed to deal with each separately and
attempt to dispose of each as being of any real aid.
a. Lex Loci Destinationis.-As the ship is at sea, so the theory
goes, the situs of the goods can only be that place to which they are
going." ' Gilmore and Black state, in commenting on Barrett v.
Bank of the Manhattan Co.,.. ..Since a security interest is a property
right, its validity should, like the validity of the bill itself, be
determined by the law of the jurisdiction which controls the
goods. . . .In determining the validity of the security interest we
should look to the law of the place where the goods are (or are en
route to) when the security interest arises."'" (Italics added.) Doubt-
less much weight is due the authority which stands behind this fine
volume; nevertheless, one cannot escape the thought that selection
of the port of destination as being the ruling law simply to conform
to the lex situs ritual is somewhat far-fetched. As this selection was
dealt with some twenty years ago, and the criticism is believed to be
still valid, one can do no better than to reiterate what was then
said. Hellendall, writing in the Canadian Bar Review,"' proposed
that the applicable law to determine problems of title to goods in
transit must be one selected on objective standards. To maintain this
position any subjective element must be overlooked; the selection
by the parties of the port of destination is entirely of a subjective
nature and therefore should not be a factor to determine the situs of
the goods. Perhaps a more valid criticism of the lex loci destinationis
approach is the stark fact that such a place (a) may not be known
at the time of the negotiation of the bill of lading (as was the case
14' An excellent Comment appears in 58 Colum. L. Rev. 212-33 (1958).
141This is the theory adopted by the Treaty of Montevideo, art. 28 (1889) (re-
vised 1940, but never ratified).
143218 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1954). It should perhaps be mentioned that the problem
discussed in this case becomes easier of solution if the thesis recommended herein for
selection of proper law is applied.
14 Gilmore and Black, Admiralty 115-16 (1957).
145 Hellendall, The Res in Transitu in The Conflict of Laws, 17 Can. B. Rev. 7, 33
(1939). Although the conclusion of this work cannot be adhered to by the present writer,
the lex loci destinationis principle remains, to him, sound.
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in The Express,"6 where the destination was described in the bill of
lading as a "safe afloat port in the United Kingdom or on the Conti-
nent"), or (b) may be changed during the course of the voyage.""
The argument might also be mentioned here, although it will apply
to all lex situs situations, that when the two parties met in Boston
and undertook to transact business there, it could not by any stretch
of the imagination be said of them that they had in contemplation
the application of any law but that of the jurisdiction in which they
were doing business. The parties, particularly the indorsee, would
have no way of knowing where the vessel might be at the time
the bill was transferred and even if they did, it would hinder their
dealings and hamper commerce generally to force them to abide by
the dictates of another legal system of which they probably have
no knowledge or inclination to follow. It is true that where a ship-
ment is inbound to a port in the United States the lex loci desti-
nationis rule does not present this difficulty.' But the problem
nevertheless remains in outward bound shipments and separate rules
for each situation would nullify the selection of such a doctrine when
the doctrine is promulgated in the interests of uniformity in the
first place.
b. Lex Loci Expeditionis.-The arguments which are arrayed
against the use of lex loci destinationis rule are not applicable to a
selection of the law of the place from which the goods are shipped
(lex loci expeditionis). The subjective element of the place of desti-
nation is not present in the selection of the place of shipment; the
location remains fixed and is known to all the parties. These are
factors on one side of the balance. However, to place the lex loci
expeditionis rule in a harsh light, imagine a bill issued in New
Orleans for a shipment from that port to Buenos Aires, and when
the ship is in the harbor at Porto Alegre, negotiation of the bill in
Ciudad Trujillo. The goods are very near the end of the voyage
(one could make the facts even more provoking by saying that, at
the time of negotiation of the bill, the ship was in the River Plate),
and all one can do is point out the apparent needlessness of applying
the law of Louisiana or the United States to govern the questions
arising from a purported transfer of title to the goods which are
some five thousand miles away; even the place of negotiation lies a
considerable distance from the place of shipment. It can only be
said in a summation of this rule, that even though it probably is the
146 (1872) 3 Adm. & Eccl. 597, 598. See Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 212, 231
n.142 (1958).
147 See Wolff, op. cit. supra note 136, at 519.
148 Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 212, 230 n.139 (1958).
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most acceptable of the five rules available, surely this cannot mean,
ipso facto, that no possible corollary rules can be made available.
To set up a class from which selection must be made to the exclusion
of any other is sometimes dangerous; very probably it is here not
so dangerous as it is confining and stifling. It places a very heavy
burden on commerce because of its requirement of application, from
the viewpoint of the indorsee of the bill of lading, of law which to
him is foreign. It too easily leads the indorsee to conclude that
henceforth he will restrict himself to the purchase of bills which
cover shipments originating in the state in which he lives.
c. Law of the Flag.-The selection of the law of the flag is one
advanced by Professor Cheshire as the correct choice of law to
govern transfer of title to chattels which are conveyed in a ship.149
This appears to be a close analogy to the lex situs rule, as it is com-
monly recognized that the ship is a part of the territory of the flag
that it flies."' If this is accepted, then there is no doubt that during
the time that the goods are in the vessel the law of the flag is in reality
the law of the situs. If goods were always delivered directly from
the hold of the vessel to the consignee, or if there were no such thing
as transhipment of goods, then the law of the flag as a choice of
law rule is an understandable and appealing selection. Unfortunately,
goods are sent from one country to another in cases where tranship-
ment is not only desirable, but necessary. If a shipment was loaded
in Baltimore for delivery in Baghdad on a bill of lading covering
the entire shipment and while the ship was in the Mediterranean the
bill was negotiated in Geneva, there is no doubt that an application
of the law of the flag as symbolizing the lex situs of the goods
would be a satisfying choice. If, however, negotiation was delayed a
few days until the goods were proceeding by rail from the port of
entry to Baghdad, application of the law of the flag becomes a little
incongruous. It may be said that in such a case separate bills of lading
should be issued to cover the sea and rail transportation. Or, if the
same bill is used, while the goods are on board ship the law of the
flag is to apply; while on the train, the law of the place of the train
at the time of negotiation should apply. To deal first with the separate
bills proposal, the inconvenience factor is, of course, evident; it is
always unwise to have two bills in circulation, both covering the
149 Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 139, at 455. His support for this thesis, however,
springs not from a case concerning transfer of title to chattels, but of owner's liability
for cargo damage. Lloyd v. Guibert, (1865) 1 Q.B. 115.
.. See Oppenheim, International Law 597 (8th ed. 1955). That the statement is not
nearly as wide as is sometimes popularly supposed; see Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 100, 123 (1922).
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same goods and even if they are issued consecutively, the sea bill
being handed over when the land bill is issued, to impose on a party
who wishes to purchase the bill in Geneva the task of looking first
to one law and then the other is beyond question a damper on com-
mercial practice. One need hardly mention that, as in the case of
shipment in a tramp steamer with transhipment anticipated by rail,
the uncertainty of time of arrival of the vessel does not lend very
much to this sort of picture. If the shipment was from Jamaica to
Quebec City on a Canadian National Steamships liner via Boston,
Massachusetts, when consideration is taken of the fact that the
vessel and the railroad are part of the same concern, owned and
operated by the Canadian Government, the issue in Jamaica of a bill
of lading covering the shipment all the way to Quebec City is not
startling. And yet, if the law of the flag is to be applied, while the
ship is at sea, Canadian law will apply. But while the goods are on
the train from Boston to Quebec, travelling through Vermont, is it
really sound reasoning to assert that if the bill is negotiated in
Detroit, Canadian law will apply in any determination of the
transfer of title to the goods simply because the law of the flag of
the ship on which the goods started their journey happens to be
Canadian law? It is submitted that while sound reasoning may favor
application of the law of the flag in many cases so as to achieve a
condition in which the lex situs will be the proper choice of law,
this simply will not stretch far enough to cover all cases and to
pursue uniformity one must consider some other choice.
d. Law of Most Substantial Connection.-Professor Cheshire pro-
poses that in the case of the transfer of movables not covered by a
document of title such as a bill of lading, there are four possible
choices as to the applicable law.15' One of these, he suggests, is the
"proper law of the transfer" or "the law of the country with which
the transfer has the most real connexion. . .. ""' If the goods are
situated in Vienna and the purported transfer takes place between
two Austrians in Prague, then the greatest number of points of
contact would be with Austria. This is a situation in which applica-
tion of the proper law theory is relatively simple. If, however, the
facts are changed so that while the goods are in Austria, an attempt
is made to transfer them in Prague by a contract in English between
a Belgian and a Swede, the application becomes somewhat more
difficult. Then when the facts are further complicated by the goods
in transit problem, the proper law theory is moved even further
.. Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 139, at 438-43.
.. Id. at 442.
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down the scale in its applicability. In fact, it becomes almost im-
possible to say that the goods are located in that place with which
they have the most substantial connection in many cases. Professor
Cheshire admits this when, in dealing with the in transitu problem,
he says that "the proper law is, no doubt, suitable to govern questions
dependent upon the effect of a particular transaction but scarcely
apposite to every question. 1..
e. Law of the Domicile of the Parties.-It has already been
mentioned "4 that the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, placing
the goods under the aegis of the domiciliary law and not in their
physical location, is a theory which has now left the scene. It may
simply be said here that, aside from the unnecessary problems
introduced onto the scene of attempting to ascertain domicile,"'
mercantile practice simply cannot stand to be stifled by such a
hyper-legalistic formula. One need not do more, it is thought, than
to point out that the domiciliary law is not of any use to settle the
problems connected with the transfer of chattles; and, certainly, as
a device to ascertain the situs of those chattels, it is doubtful if it
ever was a valid approach.
f. The Advocated Position.-From a consideration of the various
choice of law rules it should be fairly obvious that while some may
have more merit than others in their efficiency and logic, when it
comes to choose any of them as a corollary of the lex situs rule,
they simply do not fit. It can be said, without much doubt, that it
would require a stretching of each to put it in the position of being
able to handle all chattel transfer problems on a lex situs basis. If
such is the case, then it is only proper to search for some other method
of ascertaining the correct law to govern the effect of an attempted
transfer of title by a negotiation of a bill of lading.
In 1866, cotton was loaded on a vessel in Madras for shipment to
London, England. A bill of lading covering the shipment was drawn
in a set of three. A, in London, became the indorsee of these three
bills and, subsequently, he pledged the cotton by depositing two of
the bills with the pledgee. A fraudulently retained the third and
through it later sold the cotton to a third party. The question re-
solved itself into this: Did the prior handing over of the bills in the
pledge transaction defeat the later sale by the transfer of the copy
of the bill of lading? While the pledge was not made when the cotton
was in transit, which would have been a perfect example for this
... Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 139, at 454.
154 See p. 34 supra.
... To mention the acceptance of the reverter doctrine in England and Canada is
one example of the inherent difficulties of such an attempt.
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section (the pledge and the sale both dealing with property rights),
there is highly important dictum by Willes, J. which forms a very
good starting point for this second choice of the proper law to
govern the effect of a transfer of a bill of lading. During the course
of his judgment, the learned judge remarked that "while the goods
are afloat, it is common knowledge, and I should not think of citing
authorities to prove it, that the bill of lading represents them, and
the endorsement and delivery of the bill of lading while the ship is at
sea operate exactly the same as the delivery of the goods themselves
to the assignee after the ship's arrival would do."1 6
Upon this dictum Professor Beale builds his thesis. 7 which supports
what we now call the "merger" doctrine. Very simply stated it is:
When a document of title such as a bill of lading is issued, the
property in the goods becomes merged in that piece of paper so that
at any time thereafter it may always be said that the goods are em-
bodied in that document to such an extent that the situs of the
document is the situs of the goods. To the observer, this of course
readily opens a field which has a potentiality of wide scope in the
solution of just such a problem with which we have been dealing.
If this theory is to be pursued and studied to see if it will provide
the answer to the choice of law problem, it must first be divided into
two parts. Both deal with choice of law rules; the first is easy of
solution, the second provides what few difficulties there are.
Obviously, the first problem which must be solved is the selection
of the proper law to determine if the property in the goods has been
merged in the bill of lading. This has been dealt with in a very few
cases,"' but in those where it has arisen the answer has been uniform.
This uniformity is continued in the Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws wherein by section 261(1) it is provided that "whether the
title to a chattel is embodied in a document is determined by the law
of the place where the chattel is at the time when the document is
issued." It can be concluded then, that as regards the answer to the
first problem, it presents no difficulty; if the lex situs of the chattel
at the time the bill is issued says that the title to the goods is merged
in the document, then the first hurdle has been made and we must
now approach the second.'
.. Meyerstein v. Barber, (1866) 2 C.P. 37, 44.
"'Beale, supra note 135, at 538-39.
.. Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U.S. 200 (1909); Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1
(1883). Both of these cases dealt with warehouse receipts rather than bills of lading,
but it is thought that substitution of a bill of lading for a warehouse receipt in either
case would not have changed the decision. A more recent case, Barrett v. Bank of the
Manhattan Co., 218 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1954), does deal with a bill of lading and accepts
the view that is outlined in the text.
... Of course, if the law of the situs of the goods finds that there has been no merger,
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If, by application of the rule outlined in the preceding paragraph,
it is found that the property in the goods has been merged in the
document of title, the problem is still present of selection of the
appropriate law to determine if the property in the goods has passed
by a negotiation of the bill of lading. There are two possible solu-
tions to the problem. One is to apply the law of the place where the
goods are-the lex situs; and the other is to apply the law of the place
where the negotiation took place-the lex actus."'
In considering the application of the lex situs rule, one must admit
that there is some strong case law in favor of it, both in England and
in the United States. In an 1896 case,' warehouse receipts covering
goods stored in Scotland were indorsed and delivered to an individual
in England. This is the typical situation. The court had this to say:
"The crucial question in this case is whether the right . . . vests
in the pledgee of the documents . . . a real interest in the goods to
which these documents relate. That is a question which I have no
hesitation in holding must, in the circumstance of this case, be solved
by reference to the law of Scotland..'.
Even a more strengthening set of facts is presented in a
Massachusetts case.63 There, Holmes, J., even though apparently
admitting that the law of the place -where the goods are located
determines whether the property in them has become embodied in
a document,"4 maintained quite emphatically that even if such were
the case, still the law of the place wh'ere the goods were situate at
the time of the transfer governed the validity of the transfer."'
It would seem then from these two exemplary cases, that we are
thrown back into the old school of thought, for there is no doubt
that both of these cases are based entirely on the lex situs theory."'
It is submitted that such a relapse is neither necessary nor efficacious.
then we are forced back into the first choice outlined above, selection of some one of
the five rules which will provide a more or less satisfactory analogy to the original lex
situs rule.
"'°In Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 212, 229 (1958), it is proposed that there are
three possibilities, the two listed in the text herein and a third, "the law of the place
where the bill of lading is located when the transaction occurs; . . . " It is very probably
beyond doubt that when the author of this commentary estimates that there is no real differ-
ence between the second choice in the text and the quotation here, that he is correct.
However, note 173 infra should be consulted at this point.
"' Inglis v. Robertson, (1898) A.C. 616.
"' Id. at 626.
"' Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 (1883).
"64 Id. at 8-9.
""'"When a sale . . . of goods within the jurisdiction of a certain state is made else-
where, it is not only competent, but reasonable, for the state which has the goods within
its power to require them to be dealt with in the same way as would be necessary in a
domestic transaction; . . ." Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1, 7 (1883).
"'. Cf. Hellendall, supra note 145, at 24.
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It may, in fact, be shown that the second choice is preferable both
from a logical and a commercial standpoint. Hellendall.'. attempts
to place the type of transaction as seen in the two cases just out-
lined into a sort of hybrid category. He maintains that where the
goods are positively located in some jurisdiction (as they were in
both the English and the Massachusetts cases) then the lex situs rule
must apply, regardless of the presence and transfer of a negotiable
instrument in another place. He continues, however, by advocating
in that type of situation where the goods are in transit, that the
correct choice of law rule is to apply the law of the place of dispatch
or the law of the place of destination."' Even if one agrees that there
is a valid division, is it not true that the hope for uniformity has again
disappeared if the rules are thus fastened to these divisions? He pro-
poses that if goods are really in transit--on the high seas, for ex-
ample-then the lex loci destinationis should in that instance apply to
determine property rights upon an attempted transfer, whereas if it
is possible to locate the goods in some area where they have become
more or less fixed, then the lex situs should apply. Surely it can be
said that the inherent difficulty of ascertaining when goods are in
transit and when they have come to rest for purposes of the applica-
tion of the lex situs rule, is of itself sufficient to preclude such a
division. It is submitted that to strive for one rule which will cover
every case, no division depending on transit or a static situation being
made, is to be preferred and such a position can be assumed with
the application of the rule which is now set out. That is, in every
case where goods have been merged into a document (again, by
virtue of such a finding upon an application of the law of the
place where the goods were situate at the time of issue of the docu-
ment) the proper law to determine the creation of a proprietary
interest in those goods by a transfer of the document is the place at
which that transfer took place.
Is it not logical to conclude that where the situs of the goods
determines that the goods merged into the bill of lading, and since
the bill of lading now represents the goods and is the only means
of transferring title, the law of the place where the bill is negotiated
is the only law which can govern the transfer of title? For those who
desire strict uniformity it might even be effective to argue that in the
case of goods not represented by documents, the lex situs of the goods
will determine the creation and transfer of proprietary interests.
And in the case of goods which are covered by bills of lading, as the
167 Ibid.
16 Hellendall, supra note 145, at 33.
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merger doctrine has embodied the goods in the document so that it in
fact represents the goods, an application of the lex situs of the
document is an application of the lex situs of the goods. It is believed
to be preferable, however, to adhere to Professor Cheshire at this
juncture and relax a little. As he so ably puts it, "It is too often
assumed, however, that all problems must be referred to one single
law. . . .It represents an oversimplification of the position, for it is
based on the fallacy that the possible questions arising out of a
transfer of movables all fall into the same category and are all of the
same juridical nature.'' 0 It is submitted that it is preferable to make
just one division and have two rules, one to cover each of the situa-
tions. That is, if the goods are not represented by a bill of lading
or other document of title, then any attempted transfer of the
property in them should be referred for validity to the lex situs.
However, if the goods are, for example, shipped on an order bill of
lading, then the place of issue of the bill will decide (as that is where
the goods are) if there has been a merger of the goods into the bill
and then, no matter where the bill is negotiated, resort is to be had
to that place to determine the state! of the title to the goods.
A number of other reasons lend support to this rule. The first
is that as we have determined that the law of the place of negotiation
will determine the effects of negotiation, 17e it would only be confus-
ing to apply a new and perhaps different body of law to determine
the proprietary aspect of the transfer, particularly when it is con-
sidered that the two facets are somewhat close in their relations. 1 '
Also, there is the same chance here to reflect on the result of a choice
of the lex loci actus as being a selection which the parties themselves
would have made; it at least is probably the law which they con-
templated as controlling the transaction. Finally, the theory upon
which the lex situs doctrine is based (which clearly applies in the
case of goods not covered by a bill of lading) 172 that objective criteria
should be controlling, applies in support of the advocated rule. Thus,
when goods are in transit and covered by a bill of lading, logically the
only objective criteria which can be looked to in order to determine
.. Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 139, at 436-37.
170 See p. 43 supra.
171 Some cases have, in fact, contained the dual aspect of dealing with the effects of
negotiation and the transferring of property interests and have applied a single law-place
of negotiation-to both. See Roland M. Baker v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N.E. 1025
(1913).
.7. In the case of goods which are not covered by a bill of lading, the law controlling
property interests in those goods is the lex situs, and this is so for reasons other than
because of a submission by the owner to that jurisdiction. According to Hellendall, at
least, this is Savigny's reasoning. See Hellendall, supra note 145, at 7. See also
note 137 supra.
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transfer of title is the lex locus of the negotiation of the bill of
lading."3 No subjective factors are either present or pertinent.
In summary, even without the persuasive reasons outlined above,
the appeal which a rule providing the place of negotiation of the bill
as the proper law to govern the transfer of property interests would
have to mercantile men would outweigh any of the reasons for hold-
ing for the lex situs of the goods or the law of any other place. The
majority of merchants would probably be astounded to learn that
there was even a possibility that if one of them in Boston bought
a shipment of rubber, enroute in a Liberian freighter from Singapore
to Montreal via the Panama Canal, by purchase of the bill of lading
covering the shipment, his rights in it from a property standpoint
were to be determined by the law of Singapore, Panama, Canada,
Liberia, or perhaps, the United States. This danger does lie however
if the lex situs pursuit is followed. An adherence to Professor Ches-
hire's admonition for a little less uniformity will perhaps lead to a
little more uniformity in the selection of the proper law to govern
proprietary interests in goods subject to a negotiable bill of lading. ""
17 Once again, it should be repeated that in all of this it is assumed that the lex
loci actus and the lex situs of the documents is and must be the same place. While some
cases speak exclusively of the lex loci actus rather than the law of the situs of the
documents, it is very difficult to imagine a case where negotiation of a bill could take
place without the bill itself. See Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 212, 231-32 nn.144,
149, 152 (1958). The somewhat remote possibility of there being two such places should
at least be mentioned.
If the law governing negotiable money instruments is again consulted, it will be
seen that the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law provides in section 30 that negotiation
of an order instrument is had by indorsement coupled with delivery and negotiation of
a bearer instrument by delivery alone. Then the definition of delivery allows an actual
and a constructive delivery. Section 191. Presumably then, shifting to bills of lading
which may be bearer because of the last indorsement being one in blank, a case could
at least be theoretically made out that delivery in that instance might be constructive
as well. To illustrate: A bearer bill might repose in a safe deposit box in a New York
bank while the owner Y is in Chicago. Y might enter into a written agreement with X
giving the latter a power of attorney to enter the box and take delivery of the bill. If
such was considered a constructive delivery, then it might be said that the negotiation
took place in Illinois while the situs of the bill was New York, thus necessitating a
choice for proper law between these two jurisdictions, one being the lex loci actus and
the other the lex situs of the document.
It is submitted, however, that if such an argument is made that first, the lex loci
actus is the proper selection and second, that the analogy to the bill of exchange could
not bear such a technical interpretation in any case. It remains only as a "last straw"
for an otherwise hopeless case.
Note. As the Federal Bills of Lading Act, 39 Star. 542 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. §
107 (1958), and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 28, both permit negotiation
of an order bill by delivery alone, then it is at least possible for the constructive de-
livery analogy to be made. It is also interesting to note that the following statement occurs
in the Commissioners' Note to section 28 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act: "In allowing
negotiation by delivery of a bill indorsed in blank, the draft follows the rule in regard
to bills and notes, which is that also applied by mercantile usage to bills of lading."
4 Uniform Laws Ann. 52 (1922).
.. The concluding portion of this Article will be presented in the next issue of the
Journal.
